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adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law,
or otherwise.'12 This section of the act apparently was not considered by the federal dis-
trict court inasmuch as its assumption of jurisdiction would seem to deprive the Board
of "exclusive" power to prevent unfair labor practices.3 However, even if the court
found that no such practices existed and that consequently the Board's power was not
being curtailed, such determination would be tantamount to a finding on a jurisdiction-
al fact, and should not be conclusive on other tribunals asserting jurisdiction.4
It is likely that the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second District, where an appeal
is now pending, will uphold the Board in its finding of the existence of unfair labor prac-
tices. Apart from the possible use of such practices at the negotiation stage, the con-
tract itself apparently falls within the definition of unfair labor practices set forth in
section 8 (3) of the act,". . . . discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ..... " ,s Any constitutional objections as to the act itself, or to the
existence or procedure of the Board would seem to be precluded by the findings of the
Supreme Court in the case of The National Labor Relations Board v. Jons & Laugdin
Steel Corp.6
If the Board is to be an effective body, it must have exclusive jurisdiction in its
sphere of action. But assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by other bodies will be possi-
ble unless the National Labor Relations Act is construed or amended so as to preclude
other tribunals from making a determination on the jurisdictional fact of the existence
or non-existence of unfair labor practices.
Labor Law-Injunction-Sherman Act-[Federal].-Members of a trade union
seeking a closed shop agreement seized and retained the factory of the plaintiff, a
Pennsylvania manufacturer, whose raw materials come from other states and from
abroad, and most of whose finished product, amounting to $5,000,000 annually, was
shipped across state lines. The plaintiff filed a bill praying: (i) restoration of his fac-
tory; (2) an injunction enjoining the defendants from performing further acts restrain-
ing interstate commerce; and, (3) triple damage for losses sustained. Held, reversing
the district court, the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce and the injunction
should issue and the bill be re-instated. Apex Hosiery v. Leader.'
The Supreme Court in deciding on the constitutionality 2 of the Wagner Labor Re-
lations Act broadened the limits of the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the in-
terstate commerce clause so as to include those engaged primarily in production and
249 Stat. 453 (193S); 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (a) (1936).
Cf. Louisville Provision Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 545 (Ky. 1935); Kline v. Burke Con-
struction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
4 For various qualifications see i Freeman on Judgments, parts IV and V (sth ed. 1925).
549 Stat. 452 ('935); 29 U.S.C.A. § i8 (3) (1936). 6 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1936).
I go F. (2d) ISS (C.C.A. 3d 1937). Petition for certiorari will be filed. The strike was settled
by a conditional closed shop agreement and the Supreme Court may consider the question
moot.
2 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o U.S. I (1937);
National Labor Relations Board v. Fruhauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); National Labor
Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 3o U.S. 58 (1937).
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manufacturing.3 Following the Friedman-Harry Marks case4 the plaintiff would clear-
ly seem to be engaged in interstate commerce5 The conclusion seems inescapable that
this enlarged jurisdiction should apply to the federal courts when acting under the
Sherman Act as well as the Wagner Act. Thus labor's so-called victory in the Jones-
Laughlin case results in labor's being subjected to injunctions and triple damages over
a much wider field.
The right of labor unions to use the strike in labor disputes has received statutory6
and judicial7 recognition. A strike, used in the narrow sense of a collective ceasing to
work, seemingly cannot be enjoined even if a complete stoppage of interstate commerce
results.' This the court recognizes.9 Any restraint of interstate trade resulting from
illegal means, however, violates the Sherman Act.Xo Thus, in the instant case the means
being criminal- the court seems entirely correct in concluding the resulting restraint
illegal.
Almost all of the sanctions that have been employed by labor to make strikes suc-
cessful, at some time or other, have been adjudicated as illegal. 2 Since, in the light of
past and current events, it would seem quite difficult to wage a successful strike with-
out some illegal incidents,3 labor might well feel that as a practical matter there was
no "right to strike," and that every effective strike, by very reason of its effectiveness
would subject labor to the criminal sanctions of the Sherman Act.'4 Such a result would
3 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Oliver Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923); Utah P. & L. v. Pfast, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Shechter Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
4 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
5 See also National Labor Relations Board v. Santa Cruz Packing Co., 91 F. (2d) 790
(1937), where a fruit canning company whose raw material was local and only thirty-nine
per cent of whose finished product entered interstate commerce was held to be within jurisdic-
tion of the National Labor Relations Board. r Labor Relations Rep., No. 1, 22 (1937).
6 Clayton Act § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927); Norris-LaGuardia Anti-
Injunction Bill, 47 Stat. 70 (i933), 29 U.SC.A. § 105 (1936); Wagner Act § 13, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (1936).
7 Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (i9o8); American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (E921) (dictum).
8 See also 15 U.S.C.A. I5.(1926); 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927); 47 Stat. 70
(1933), 29 U.S.C.A. § 105 (1936).
9P. x6o.
'a Coronado Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeyman Stone Cutter's Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 433 (1921); Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); cf. United
Leather Workers v. Herkort and Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924).
Is r8 Purdon's Pa. Stat. § Six (1930).
1 See Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes, 53-54, 58-59 (1932); Bull v. Interna-
tional Alliance, ii9 Kan. 713 (1925), 241 Pac. 459; State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W.
302 (1936); Note Io supra.
'3 See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, 35 Mich. L.R. 73, 87 (1936); Frankfurter
and Greene, The Labor Injunction 73 (1930); Sokolsky, Law and Labor, Atlantic Monthly 429
(1937).
14 x. Labor Relations Report No. 1, 3 (1937).
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necessitate either: (i) abandoning the strike as a weapon-a course unthinkable to
labor; (2) attempting to strike effectively without technical violations of the law-a
feat well nigh impossible; s (3) continuing to strike and to defy the law 6 --a choice in-
tolerable to organized society; or, (4) working for amendment of the Sherman Act7
and for legislation exempting labor unions and officers from liability for tortious acts
committed on their behalf during industrial disputes. 8
Mortgages-Priorities-Purchaser without Notice-under Recording Act-[Oregon].
-The defendant, a first mortgagee, released the mortgagor from liability in exchange
for a conveyance of the fee. Before doing so, however, the defendant procured and had
recorded a satisfaction of a junior mortgage upon part payment to the junior mort-
gagee, without requesting the production of the junior mortgage and note which had
previously been transferred to the plaintiff under an unrecorded assignment. An Ore-
gon statute provides, ".. .. a satisfaction or release of said mortgage by the party ap-
pearing upon said record to be the owner and holder of said mortgage shall operate to
free the land described in such mortgage from the lien of such mortgage, so far as re-
gards all subsequent purchasers and incumbrances for value, and without notice."',
The plaintiff commenced suit to enforce his lien, and a decree of foreclosure was ren-
dered. On appeal, held, reversed. The defendant comes within the protection of the
statute. Wlillanete Collection & Credit Service v Gray.2
The rule is well settled under recording acts that a bona fide purchaser of property
from a mortgagor, who finds upon the record a satisfaction or release by the record
mortgagee and relies thereupon, is given priority over one whose claim is based upon an
unrecorded assignment from the mortgagee.3 The principle upon which this rule rests
is that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss, he whose negligence caused
the injury should bear it.4 The assignee may record his assignment and avert the loss,
while there is nothing feasible the purchaser can do. Purchasers who fail to exert
reasonable efforts in a practicable search for unrecorded conveyances and encum-
brances, however, are not necessarily within the protection of the recording acts. Thus,
a purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of encumbrances referred to in in-
struments in his chain of title.s In a purchase from one not in possession, a purchaser
is put upon inquiry to determine the interest of one whose possession is inconsistent
with the record title.6 And when the record shows an unsatisfied mortgage and the re-
IS See note 12 supra.
26 Garrison, Government and Labor-The Latest Phase, 37 Col. L.R. 897, 905 (g937); Sat.
Eve. Post, October 2, 1937.
17 Woll, 147 Ann. Amer. Acad. 185 (1930).
is Note British Trades Disputes Act of 19o6, 6 Edw. VII, c. 47 (igo6).
I Ore. Code 193o § 54-log. 2 70 P. (2d) 39 (Ore. 1937).
3 Porter v. Ourada, 51 Neb. 510, 71 N.W. 52 (1897); Swasey v. Emerson, 168 Mass. 118,
46 N.E. 426 (2897); Newman v. Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 14 Ariz. 354, 128 Pac. 53 (1912);
Stetler v. Winegar, 75 Colo. 50o, 226 Pac. 858 (1924).
4 See Porter v. Ourada, 5i Neb. 520, 7 N.W. 52 (1897).
s Crawford v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 112 ]11.314 (1884); Sweet v. Henry, 175 N.Y. 268,67 N.E.
574 (i9o3); Carter v. Leonard, 65 Neb. 679, 91 N.W. 574 (1902).
6 Kirby v. Tallmage, i6o U.S. 379 (i895); Phelan v. Brady, 9ig N.Y. 587, 23 N.E. io9
(i8go); Rayburn v. Davisson, 22 Ore. 242, 29 Pac. 738 (1892).
